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‘Turn your keys in, fellows’: How the Ontario NDP and Liberals worked together to end 42 years of Tory rule

The PCs came away with the most seats in the 1985 provincial election. But the NDP held the balance of power — and the Liberals were willing to make a deal
Written by Jamie Bradburn
Sep 16, 2024
Photo from the front page of the May 29, 1985, edition of the Toronto Sun showing David Peterson (left) and Bob Rae.

“On May 2, 1985, the people of Ontario created an opportunity for change after 42 years of Conservative government. We are determined to accept responsibility for bringing about this change … In the interests of making minority government work, we are committed to a program of public policy reforms which will improve the quality of life for everybody in this province. We are also committed to legislative reforms designed to improve public access to and information about the legislative process in Ontario.” — opening to An Agenda for Reform: Proposals for Minority Parliament, May 1985

After the 1985 provincial election, the Progressive Conservatives came away with the highest seat count (52) but found themselves in an extremely fragile position. The NDP held the balance of power and could use its 25 seats to keep the PCs in place — or to support the first Liberal-led government since 1943.

“This is a really difficult situation for all three parties,” Liberal leader David Peterson told the Globe and Mail. “History doesn’t teach us a lot of lessons, but it behooves no one to be arrogant in these circumstances.”

Nearly a month of brokering produced a historic two-year accord between the Liberals and NDP. Over that time, the parties agreed not to call a snap election and passed 117 bills that drew from their respective platforms.

Since assuming the Liberal leadership in 1982, Peterson had worked hard to make his party more attractive to urban voters, and his efforts paid off during the election. His advisers suggested that, given the inexperience of his MPPs and the disoriented state of the PCs, he should seize the opportunity to take power. Peterson didn’t feel comfortable working with the PCs, due to Premier Frank Miller’s waffling on controversial policies such as the full funding of Roman Catholic schools.

Cartoon about the impending announcement of the accord from the May 28, 1985, edition of the Globe and Mail (left); Cartoon by Andy Donato after the announcements of the accord, from the May 29, 1985, edition of the Toronto Sun.

The NDP had historically been antagonistic to the Liberals, as the Grits had been a rural, anti-labour, conservative-leaning party. The caucus split into three groups: those who wanted a formal coalition with the Liberals, those who rejected coalition but wanted the party to act much the way it had during Pierre Trudeau’s and Bill Davis’s minorities in the 1970s, and those who wanted to boot out the PCs but couldn’t stomach forming a government with the Liberals. Former Ontario NDP leaders Michael Cassidy, Stephen Lewis, and Donald Macdonald were leery of any agreement, fearing political suicide. The federal NDP worried about the impact on their poll numbers, which were rising as support for Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and federal Liberal leader John Turner dropped.

The NDP caucus supported the idea of a written accord with whoever would support it. Leader Bob Rae felt that such a document could bring stability to the legislature, especially as none of the parties could financially afford another election. It would be different from situations in which a minority government was propped up on a bill-by-bill basis (the case with Bill Davis’s administrations between 1975 and 1981) or used a supply-and-confidence agreement (such as the recently ended alliance between the federal Liberals and NDP). If a legislative agenda was agreed upon, the NDP would not introduce any non-confidence motions for the next two years.

Agenda segment, June 26, 2010: David Peterson — Ending the Tory dynasty

All three parties formed negotiating teams: The NDP chose caucus whip Ross McClellan, Oshawa MPP Mike Breaugh, and party aide Hugh Mackenzie. The PCs selected former minister of labour Robert Elgie, soon-to-be-party leader Larry Grossman, and future party leader/Toronto mayor John Tory. The Liberals went with former party leader Bob Nixon, veteran MPP Sean Conway, and party aide Hershell Ezrin.

Trust was a problem in meetings between the NDP and the PCs. Rae claimed that Miller was unreceptive to his demand for a legislative agenda and written agreement. The PCs claimed that such a pact would be illegitimate, a view Toronto Star Queen’s Park columnist Rosemary Speirs believed fit “neatly with the Conservatives’ emotional reaction that somehow they have been betrayed.” Speirs quoted a senior PC who referred to a Liberal-NDP deal as an opportunity to “let them slime around together.” Miller complained that no government would agree to limit its existence; Rae later reflected that “the Tories would have mortgaged their grandmothers if it had meant they could have stayed in power.”

David Peterson holding up a copy of the accord. (Hamilton Spectator, May 29, 1985)

Initially, the Liberals were interested in trying to form a government alone. But they came to view an accord as a golden opportunity to implement their platform. “The accord agenda provided a shopping list of things Ontarians, by and large, thought should have been addressed in the previous 10 years but weren’t,” observed Ian Scott, who would serve as attorney general during the accord period. “That agenda was an agenda we would have come to on our own, even if the NDP hadn’t discussed it with us. They were the obvious, easy things to do.”

During his final meeting with Rae, Peterson admitted he couldn’t wrap his head around the idea that individual tax measures could be defeated without leading to a confidence vote; in response, Rae laughed and said he wasn’t going to budge. Under the final agreement, which covered the next two years, Peterson agreed not to call an election and Rae agreed not to move or support non-confidence motions. The policies would primarily be those the Liberals had campaigned on that were of the most concern to the NDP. Rae later admitted that he should have pushed to include NDP members in Peterson’s cabinet.

On May 24, Rae announced his intention to work with the Liberals for the next four years. “In the life of this province,” he observed that day, “42 years is enough.”

Front page of the May 29, 1985, edition of the Toronto Sun.

Miller claimed the accord — especially the agreement to avoid an election for two years — would damage the parliamentary system. “No one can predict the vagaries and exigencies of a legislative session, nor the emergencies which any government may face,” Miller observed in his official statement that day. “Such emergencies could conceivably give rise to fundamental clashes of principle, which the public would be entitled to have fully debated without restrictions flowing from prior agreements and if necessary, put to the ultimate test of public choice through the electoral process.”

“If I have spelled the death knell of my own government,” Miller declared, “it had better be that than to spell the death knell of our form of government.”

Constitutional experts debated the legality of the accord: Some said it could lead to deadlock if too many bills were defeated while the government stayed in power. Others believed it would give the Liberals the time they needed to learn how to run the province again after having been in opposition for so long.

Cartoon from the June 19, 1985, edition of the Globe and Mail.

Prior to the accord being signed and released to the public on May 28, Rae received a call from Ezrin indicating that Peterson wouldn’t attend any joint signing ceremony and that each leader should have his own press conference. Rae realized Peterson didn’t want to be seen with the guy who was making him premier.

An Agenda for Reform: Proposals for Minority Parliament contained three sections. The first focused on legislative reforms, including a freedom-of-information and privacy-protection bill, a select committee to review procedures for public-sector appointments and patronage posts, and changes to election-financing laws.

The second section highlighted legislation that would be introduced over the next session and address such issues as the full funding of separate schools, the reform of tenant-protection laws and the Occupational Health and Safety Act, and the arbitration of first-contract disputes between employers and unions.

The final section spotlighted longer-term goals, which were described in the accord as a “program for action from common campaign proposals, to be implemented within a framework of fiscal responsibility.” These included:

Newspaper editorials generally supported the accord, though some pundits questioned allowing the third-place party to dictate legislation. Miller was criticized for his statements, and his credibility took a hit. The Kingston Whig-Standard called Miller’s remarks “downright cheap and demeaning not only to members of the opposition, but also to voters, the majority of whom elected an opposition.”

As a Windsor Star editorial concluded, “the agreement was produced quickly, with consummate political skill for negotiation and compromise, and with what appear to be constructive ends. If the signers can carry those abilities into the future they plan, they may not reach the rhetorical goal of improving the quality of life for everyone, but they should be able to furnish good, and for a time stable, government.”

Editorial cartoon from the June 1, 1985, edition of the Kingston Whig-Standard.

In the June 4 throne speech, the Miller government proposed many initiatives and reforms that resembled elements of the accord; the opposition viewed it as a final attempt to stay in power. The PCs had few illusions about how they’d fare in a non-confidence vote, so they introduced a platform that might make it politically embarrassing to vote against them

Miller continued to try to persuade the NDP to keep him in office, claiming that during the election campaign, Rae had promised to co-operate with a PC minority. Rae told the legislature on June 7 that it wasn’t healthy for a party to be in power for so long: “It is time to go. It is time to move on. Turn your keys in, fellows — it is over.” Peterson argued that the PCs were no longer fit to govern, because they failed to deal with problems ranging from discrimination to pollution.

Photos of the end of the legislative session that was the last for the accord. (Toronto Star, June 26, 1987)

Despite Miller’s warnings that the NDP were “prostituting themselves” and that the Liberals would break the accord and rush into a snap election, his government fell on June 18 after being defeated 72-52 on a non-confidence motion introduced by Rae. 

That summer, Rae faced criticism from some NDP diehards who believed the party was comfortable only in opposition, a stance he disagreed with. “Throughout my political life,” Rae later wrote, “I have disagreed with the perspective that it is more moral to be out of power than in; that being on the margins waving a placard or shaking a fist is ethically superior to making decisions which often require us to choose, not between black and white, but between shades of grey.”

By the time the accord officially ended on June 26, 1987, the legislature had passed 117 bills that covered nearly all the issues outlined in the agreement. Assessing the impact of the accord, Kingston Whig-Standard columnist Harvey Schacter noted that it avoided many issues that usually plagued coalition governments. “It allowed government measures to be defeated, while the government continued in office. That ensured better legislation, through jockeying between the three parties, than if a Liberal-NDP majority simply rammed through policies.”

Cartoon by Barbara Spurll from the June 27, 1987, edition of the Toronto Star (left); Cartoon by Duncan Macpherson following the calling of the 1987 provincial election, from the August 1, 1987, edition of the Toronto Star.

Rae was pleased that most of the NDP’s demands had been met but disappointed that action in some areas, such as workers’-compensation reform, was incomplete. In his view, the accord had ensured stability, allowed reforms to occur, and created unity within his party. “If you look at what was being written two years ago, we were going to disappear. It was the death knell of the NDP, we would evaporate,” he told the Hamilton Spectator. “I think we’ve done a whole lot better than people expected.”

Peterson was more upbeat. “I have no reservations about its success,” he told Maclean’s. “We worked out a constructive agenda. Everyone won.” When asked by the HamiltonSpectator whether the deal had created a new precedent or been a historical accident, Peterson admitted, “I don’t know the answer to that.”

With the Liberals polling at nearly 50 per cent of voter support, Peterson called an election for September 10. Under the slogan “Leadership That’s Working,” Peterson promised to carry on reforms but made giving Ontario a voice in free-trade negotiations with the United States one of his main planks. The NDP campaigned on standing up for “ordinary people” and “working families,” but the strength of the Liberal lead and the failure of the accord to boost NDP support left party organizers struggling to keep party workers motivated.

Cartoon by Patrick Corrigan from the September 5, 1987, edition of the Toronto Star.

Some polling conducted by the NDP, PCs, and Toronto Star suggested that voters would be happy with another minority government. Many of those polled cited how active the government had been during the accord period. “I think a minority is more likely to be responsible to the voters because of that underlying fear of being bounced out of office,” one voter told the Toronto Star. “Even your local MPP will be more in touch with the needs of his riding as opposed to just sloughing them off.”

Those hoping for another minority were disappointed, as the Liberals won 95 seats. Though the NDP fell to 19 seats, it gained a greater share of the popular vote and became the official Opposition; it went on to win the 1990 election. The PCs collapsed to third place with 16 seats and wouldn’t recover until Mike Harris led them to victory in 1995.

In 2005, when Prime Minister Paul Martin was working on an arrangement with the NDP to keep his government afloat, Toronto Star columnist Jim Coyle observed of the accord that “it may have been the happiest 24 months Ontarians have known in the last two decades — there seeming to be general support for NDP ideas in the government hopper so long as NDP hands aren’t directly on the government steering wheel.”

Sources: Not Without Cause by Georgette Gagnon and Dan Rath (Toronto: HarperPerennial, 1991); From Protest to Power by Bob Rae (Toronto: Penguin, 1997); the May 9, 1985, May 25, 1985, May 29, 1985, June 5, 1985, June 8, 1985, and June 19, 1985, editions of the Globe and Mail; the June 26, 1987 edition of the Hamilton Spectator; the June 1, 1985, and June 25, 1987, editions of the Kingston Whig-Standard; the July 6, 1987, edition of Maclean’s; the May 25, 1985, September 5, 1987, and April 28, 2005, editions of the Toronto Star; and the May 30, 1985, edition of the Windsor Star.